Path-Dependent Behavior with Asymmetric Information about Traders' Types by Testa, Alessia
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 · www.sfbtr15.de 
Universität Mannheim · Freie Universität Berlin · Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin · Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn · Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung Mannheim 
 
Speaker: Prof. Dr. Klaus M. Schmidt · Department of Economics · University of Munich · D-80539 Munich, 
Phone: +49(89)2180 2250 · Fax: +49(89)2180 3510 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* University of Bonn 
 
 
 
 
July 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB/TR 15 is gratefully acknowledged. 
 
Discussion Paper No. 388 
 
Path-Dependent Behavior with 
Asymmetric Information about 
Traders’ Types 
 
Alessia Testa* 
Path-Dependent Behavior with Asymmetric Information
about TradersTypes
Alessia Testay
University of Bonn
July 29, 2012
Abstract
We dene path-dependency as the generic phenomenon according to which agents
take an action regardless of their private information. Path-dependency can be of two
types contingent on whether agents act with the crowd (herding) or against the crowd
(contrarianism). We consider a quote-driven market where traders can in some cases
observe whether their predecessors were informed, although they cannot observe their
private information, while in other cases they are left with the uncertainty that their
predecessors acted purely for liquidity motives. In this setting we recover herding and
contrarianism and we nd that better-informed markets (i.e. where informed traders
receive high precision signals) can generate path-dependent behavior more easily than
poorly informed ones. Moreover, we illustrate how a market dominated by herding features
a price that is more informative of the asset value than the price of a market where traders
always follow their signal. We also discuss how contrarianism has the exact opposite e¤ect
by decreasing price informativeness. (JEL D82, D83, G14)
I would like to thank Amil Dasgupta, Ian Jewitt, Pete Kyle, Meg Meyer, Sujoy Mukerji, Han Ozsoylev,
Bruno Strulovici and Dezsö Szalay for their useful comments and suggestions. I also beneted from conversations
with Godfrey Keller, Andrea Patacconi, Robert Ritz and Chris Wallace. All mistakes are mine.
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1 Introduction
We study the failure of information aggregation in nancial markets where traders show up
sequentially in front of a competitive and risk neutral market maker to trade the only asset in
the economy. By acting upon the reception of private information about the value of the asset,
traders release this information to the public, allowing the market maker and, in general, the
economy to learn about its true value.
The types of failure of information aggregation we focus on are herd behavior, contrarianism
and informational cascades. We group herding and contrarianism under the label of path-
dependent behavior, and we describe this as the phenomenon by which an individual takes an
action independently of his private information. While engaging in herd behavior an individual
disregards his information to follow the crowd, whereas when engaging in contrarian behavior an
individual disregards his private information to go against the crowd. An informational cascade
takes place when everybody in the economy engages in path-dependent behavior, whether this
is herding or contrarianism. In the spirit of Chamley [3], we trace the di¤erence between path-
dependency and informational cascades in the fact that the former occurs at an individual level,
while there is still the possibility that some agents private information induces him to take a
di¤erent action. This possibility is not realized, but the very fact that it is not realized yields
information that is incorporated in the social learning: learning slows down but does not stop
completely. On the other hand, in an informational cascade all the individuals in the economy
are engaging in path-dependency, for the public belief dominates the private belief of every
individual. As a consequence, actions do not disclose any new private information, beliefs do
not change and, if everything else remains the same, learning stops forever. It follows that, in
general, an informational cascade implies path-dependency, but the contrary does not need to
be true.
The seminal paper by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch [2] (BHW henceforth) seems
to suggest that informational cascades are more likely to occur when each individuals private
information is very accurate. However, in another seminal paper, Avery and Zemsky [1] (AZ
henceforth) study herding in nancial markets and conclude that when the quality of the private
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information is poor enough one can build trading histories generating herd behavior. We would
like to cast some light on the role that the quality of private information plays in achieving
herding in nancial markets, and on whether there is something special about nancial markets
that overturns the early intuition found in BHW. We start by reviewing their results and by
illustrating some of the latest ndings in the literature.
BHW challenges the e¢ ciency outcome of market equilibrium when individuals act sequen-
tially and the price for taking an action is xed ex ante. In their model, the rst person who
does not follow his signal to follow the crowd triggers something irreversible and learning stops
completely. Agents di¤er only by their private information, so once their actions become inde-
pendent of it, they become identical. It follows that whenever a particular individual takes an
action regardless of his private information, this would be the case for any other individual in
the economy: once someone herds, anybody else would herd in his place and an informational
cascade is generated.
The key feature of models with a xed price of adoption is that, eventually, individual beliefs
reach some threshold above (below) which no private information can take the expected value of
adoption given those beliefs below (above) the price ever again. In nancial markets, however,
prices respond to the trading activity. AZ recover the e¢ ciency result of asset markets with
sequential trading, where prices are set via a bid-ask mechanism. They show that informational
cascades can never occur as long as market prices are exible and, in general, that herding
cannot occur unless asymmetric information of a particular kind, for instance in the form
of event uncertainty, is introduced. Under event uncertainty, not only there is uncertainty
about the value of the asset (which they call value uncertainty), but also the asset could have
changed its value in an one-o¤ event (a shock) in the course of trading; traders are informed
on whether a shock has occurred, whereas the market maker can only learn this by observing
the trading behavior of the market participants. Event uncertainty makes traders respond to
the informational event faster than the market maker, who assigns too much of the trading to
the activity of noise traders. Hence, event uncertainty slows the price adjustment in the short
run, creating some form of inexibility and allowing for herd behavior to occur. AZ nd that,
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for a given trading history, herding occurs more easily in poorly informed markets.
In a recent paper, Park and Sabourian [5] (PS henceforth) generalize AZs private informa-
tion structure. Within a state space of at least three elements, they investigate the impact of
di¤erent signal congurations on path-dependent behavior. In particular, they dene U-shaped
signals as those signals moving probability mass from moderate to extreme states; correspond-
ingly, they call signals moving probability mass from extreme to moderate states hill-shaped.
PS show that with a state space of at least three elements, U-shaped signals with positive or
negative bias (i.e. giving more weight to the good or bad state, respectively) are necessary and
(almost) su¢ cient to generate herd behavior, while biased hill-shaped signals are necessary and
(almost) su¢ cient to generate contrarianism. For an intuition of their result, consider, as an
example, a trader who receives a U-shaped signal with a negative bias. This signal assigns more
weight to the extreme states and, due to the negative bias, it induces a trader who has observed
nothing but his signal to sell. Suppose that, before placing his order, the trader in question
observes a trading history that convinces him that the negative state is almost impossible. In
light of this new information, the negative bias has no bite and the signal transfers almost all
of the probability mass from the intermediate state to the positive one, inducing the trader to
buy following the crowd.
The nancial market we consider is represented by a trading room populated by a countable
number of agents who are randomly selected one at the time to trade one unit of an asset with
a perfectly competitive and risk neutral market maker. Traders can be of two types: with
probability (1  ) they are of type I, in which case they are informed with probability one;
or, with probability , they are type II traders, in which case they can either be informed with
probability (1  ), or noise traders with probability . Informed traders receive informative
private signals conditional on which they update their beliefs before trading, whereas noise
traders do not receive any private information and buy and sell with equal probability. Traders
can observe each otherstypes, namely they can tell whether someone trading at some time t is
a type I or a lottery trader; however, in the case a trader is of type I, his private signal cannot
be observed, and in case he is a lottery trader it cannot be said whether he is informed or not,
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let alone, in case he is informed, his private information. The market maker cannot observe
either types or signals.
This set-up can be seen as capturing the concept of neighborhood such as, for instance,
the trading oor of a nancial institution, where traders know the types but not the specic
information of their clients, and share this information and the corresponding order ow, but
not necessarily the identity of the clients, with the rest of the trading oor. The latter serves
the purpose of gathering together the order ow, with traders acting on behalf of their clients.
With the concept of the trading room, we are modelling the clients directly as traders who can
observe each otherstypes. The two types of clients we have in mind are hedge funds trading
primarily upon the reception of by private information, and investment funds whose trades can
be driven by private information, but also by the issuance and redemption of shares. The latter
reason for trading does not reveal any private information and it is completely unrelated to the
markets trading history. A trader revealing that he has been executing the order of a type I
(hedge) fund can be in the interest of his client: by moving the market in the direction of his
trade, the client is more likely to prot from a capital gain.
The existence of herd and contrarian behavior is driven by the asymmetry of information
between the traders and the market maker, who sets prices via a bid-ask mechanism à la
Glosten and Milgrom [4] (GM henceforth). In particular, in face of a long enough realization
of type I buys, traders update their beliefs as if they had full information about the signal
realizations; on the other hand, the market maker has to consider the eventuality that the
trades he observes are generated by noise. This causes his pricing to be rigid enough for traders
to nd it advantageous to buy regardless of their signal. Contrarianism is the consequence of
type II trading activity. The probability of noise conditional on observing a type II trader is
higher than the overall fraction of noise traders: this causes the price to react too muchto
the trading activity and causes traders to ignore their private information to go against the
market.
We prove the existence of trading histories such that herd and contrarian behaviors occur
with positive probability. We nd that, for any trading history, herding and contrarianism
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occur more easily in better-informed markets, i.e. markets with high-precision signals, than in
poorly-informed markets. This is because a very precise signal exacerbates the informational
asymmetry between the traders and the market maker. Once a trader acts regardless of his
signal, the rest of the traders do not update their beliefs anymore whereas the market maker is
learning that either herding or contrarianism is taking place. This continues until the market
maker realigns prices to reect the information present in the market.
The analysis suggests that allowing traders to observe each others types when the share of
type I traders is high is benecial to the informativeness of the price: herd behavior causes the
price to realign with the valuation of the fully informed type I traders and it suppresses the
opinion of the (mistaken) minority. Correspondingly, allowing traders to observe each others
types when the fraction of type II traders is high generates contrarianism. Type II trades
introduce too much noise in the eyes of the traders, and they do so in a non-neutral way but
in the direction of the correct state of the world. For instance, when V = 1 traders attribute
too many of the buy orders to noise originating contrarian selling to the detriment of price
informativeness.
We also reconcile our results with AZ. Indeed, our information structure is similar to the
one in AZs event uncertainty in that it is formed by three levels: a rst level is the public
information that is common knowledge among the traders and the market maker and it is
represented by the trading history; a second level can be thought of as public information
among traders, which is common knowledge only among traders and consists, on top of the
trading history, of the types of the traders associated with past trades; as a third level there
is the tradersprivate information. The di¤erence in the information structure between this
model and AZs is that, in the latter, an exogenous shock is needed to create this intermediate
level of information, whereas in the present paper this is obtained by allowing traders to know
something more about each other. As in AZ, this intermediate level of information creates price
rigidity and allows for herd behavior to occur. As the information structure is equivalent to
the one in AZ, similar notions of herding and contrarianism are used.
Changing the nature of the intermediate level in the information structure is not just a way
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of re-interpreting the source of uncertainty and informational asymmetry. In fact, this has an
important implication, namely a gain in tractability which allows for a smaller state space and
that enables us to state the conditions for herding and contrarianism in terms of exogenous
variables only. This has deep consequences for our comparative statics. In fact, we nd that
herding and contrarianism occurs with positive probability after some trading history when
the signal precision is above some threshold. AZ, though, construct trading histories such that
herd behavior occurs at a certain time t if the signals precision is below some threshold. This
apparent contradiction disappears if we notice that the threshold below which AZs market
herds depends on the market participantsposterior beliefs prior to herding, whereas our cut-
o¤ level is only a function of exogenous variables, namely the level of noise trading, and of the
type-composition of the market.
AZ do not link the formation of the posterior beliefs to the quality of information. They
simply state that, once those beliefs come into place, it is easier to herd for low values of the
precision. To x ideas, consider the case of herd buying; herd buying occurs when a trader
buys regardless of his signal, in particular with a low signal. For this to happen, after observing
the trading history, the tradersvaluation of the asset prior receiving a low signal must be high
enough, and the market maker valuation prior receiving a buy order must be low enough, in
relative terms, so that even after the reception of a low signal and of a buy order, respectively,
the gap between the updated valuation and the ask price is preserved. As long as the traders
valuation of the asset is higher than the market makers valuation, there exists a threshold
below which herding occurs: the lower the signal precision the less sensitive the decrease in
valuation upon the reception of a low signal by the traders, and the smaller the increase in
the ask price by the market maker. Hence, once the asymmetry of information has generated
some gap in valuations, a lower signal works better in order to preserve this gap. Our result
does not contradict all this as, in addition, it has something to say about how the gap in the
posterior beliefs was formed in the rst place in relation to the quality of information. We nd
conditions on the signal precision and on the level of noise under which the gap in valuations
can be built through the trading history starting from t = 0 and such that herd buying occurs.
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We face a trade-o¤: if on the one hand it is still true that once a gap in beliefs is in place a lower
signal precision works better to preserve it, on the other hand, the higher the signal precision
the stronger the asymmetry of information between traders and market maker, the faster their
valuations diverge. The trade-o¤ is resolved in favor of a high signal precision, for any level of
noise and type-composition of the market. From the perspective of a single periods trading,
assuming that the valuations have already accumulated a gap in the rightdirection, there is
no discordance between AZs result and ours, although ours identies conditions such that the
rightgap is built through the trading history.
Finally, we can interpret our result within PSs general signal structure: for instance, the
signal congurations that generate herd buying (selling) more easily are those that are the
fastest in moving probability mass towards the good (bad) state.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the structure of the model and ad-
dresses the problem of the market makers pricing rule in presence of herd behavior; Section
3 studies the case where the possibility of herd and contrarian behavior occurs for the rst
time in the trading history and establishes its existence; Section 4 reconciles our results with
those in AZ and Section 5 concludes by discussing the informational properties of the price in
a market where herding and contrarianism take place compared to a market where everybody
always follows his private information.
2 The Model
There is a nite set of risk neutral players N = f1; 2; :::g who show up randomly and anony-
mously at the post of a perfectly competitive and risk neutral market maker in order to trade
one unit of the only asset available in the economy, asset that can take value V 2 f0; 1g. Trading
happens sequentially, i.e. only one trader at the time can show up in front of the market maker;
moreover, agents can only trade once in their lifetime. Time is discrete, t 2 f1; 2; :::; Tg, where
T is the time when the asset is liquidated and the capital gain (loss) is realized. At each point
in time, the market maker posts a bid Bt and an ask At price at which he commits to trade.
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Agents, if called to trade, decide whether to buy, sell or not trade at all given those prices. We
indicate a generic action/trade at t with at 2 fbuy, sell, no tradeg, while the realized price at
time t is denoted by V mt .
Agents can be of two types: they are either type I traders with probability (1  ), or
they are type II traders. Type I traders are informed with probability one and receive an
informative signal  about the value of the asset, while type II traders are either informed
with probability (1  ) or noise traders with probability . Both typesdraws and the draws
determining whether a type II trader is informed or not are independent and independent from
each other. Noise traders trade for liquidity reasons and they are assumed to buy and sell with
equal probability1.
Signals can be either high (H) or low (L) and, conditional on V , they are independent.
The probability that a signal reveals the true state is p > 1
2
, i.e. Pr f = H j V = 1g =
Pr f = L j V = 0g = p, where the initial common prior is 0 = Pr fV = 1g = 12 . We take
the convention according to which informed traders receive their signal only at the moment
in which they are called to trade. This is without loss of generality and it is going to make
the exposition simpler, as it implies that, before being called to trade, traders share the same
valuation for the asset.
Each period the selected trader is assigned a type which can be observed by the other
traders but not by the market maker. It follows that if a trader is observed to be of type I, he
is automatically recognized to be informed, although his signal cannot be observed by anybody
else but himself. If the selected trader is observed to be of type II, his fellow traders cannot
distinguish whether he is informed or a noise trader. The market maker does not know either
the type or the signal of the trader: he just receives the trading order and executes it, while the
other traders observe the realized price. Therefore, traders not only can observe the trading
history that has unfolded up to the point when they are called to trade, but they are also given
a little bit more information compared to the market maker, namely they know the type of the
trader active at each point in time.
1The case where noise traders do not trade is omitted, as by its own denition a noise trader needs to trade
to be such.
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The di¤erent possible transactions in every period together with all the possible bid and ask
prices form the space 
 = fbuy, sell, no tradeg[0; 1]2, which is identical for all t 2 f1; 2; :::; Tg,
so that the space of all possible trading sequences is H = QTt=1 
t, where 
t = 
. Call F the
algebra on H, and fFtg the corresponding ltration.
Each traders information is composed of three parts: the trading history, a vector of types
of those who traded before him, and his private signal. Formally, indicate with  t a random
variable that takes value 1 if the trader at t is of type I and 0 if the trader at t is of type II.
Call N = Tt=1 f1; 0gt the history of types and fTtg the corresponding ltration. Then, each
traders information structure at time t is represented by the ltration
I it	 = Ft; Tt; i	 ,
where agent is private information consists in his private signal i.
We use the convention of indicating with t 1 the generic posterior probability generated
by trading at t 1 and that is carried over to period t as a prior, so we use the phrase posterior
at t  1and prior at tinterchangeably to mean t 1.
Call it the posterior probability that, at time t, agent i assigns to the event that the true
value of the asset is 1, where i = ? if i is not trading a t:
it = Pr
 
V = 1 j at; I it

(1)
=
Pr (at j V = 1;Ft; Tt; i) it 1
Pr (at j V = 1;Ft; Tt; i) it 1 + Pr (at j V = 0;Ft; Tt; i)
 
1  it 1
 ;
Correspondingly, the tradersvaluation of the asset is
V it = E

V j at; I it

= E

V j I it+1

= 1 it + 0
 
1  it

= it
It is understood that the optimal decision for an informed trader i called to trade at time t
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is
buy if V it > At; (2)
sell if V it < Bt: (3)
The market maker is Bayesian and updates his beliefs given the trading history. Call mt
the probability that, at time t, the market maker assigns to the event that V = 1 given the
trading history:
mt = Pr (V = 1 j at;Ft)
=
Pr (at j Ft; V = 1)mt 1
Pr (at j Ft; V = 1)mt 1 + Pr (at j Ft; V = 0)
 
1  mt 1
 : (4)
Correspondingly, the market makers valuation of the asset is:
V mt = E [V j at;Ft] = E [V j Ft+1] (5)
= Pr [V = 1 j Ft+1] = mt .
In setting the price at the beginning of time t, the market maker does not know whether he
will be facing a buy or a sell order. Conditional on a buy or a sell, he will post an ask and a
bid price respectively so that the zero prot condition is satised:
At = E [V j Ft; at = buy] = E

V j Ft; V it > At

(6)
Bt = E [V j Ft; at = sell] = E

V j Ft; V it < Bt

: (7)
If at time t the trading order is a buy (sell), then we will refer to At (Bt) as the realized
price and we will indicate it with V mt , the valuation of the asset by the market maker at the
beginning of time t+ 1.
Denition 1 (Equilibrium). An equilibrium consists of a system of individual trading strate-
gies as in (2) and (3), and a system of prices satisfying (6) and (7).
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Typically, in models where generic agents or traders are the only actors in the economy
(e.g. [2]), the public information is common knowledge and the private signal constitutes the
only private information. In an economy where traders are not alone because of the presence
of a market maker, the distinction between private and public information is not that stark. In
the model presented here there are three levels of knowledge: the public information Ft, which
is common knowledge among the traders and the market maker; the information contained in
(Ft; Tt), which is common knowledge only among traders; nally, the private signal i, which
we will refer to as private information. As pointed out in the introduction, this information
structure parallels AZs one under event uncertainty. For this reason, we adopt the same
denition of herding. Roughly, an agent is herding if he disregards his private signal to trade
in the direction of the market. Furthermore, an agent engages in contrarian behavior if he
disregards his private signal to trade against the market. The denitions are given abstracting
from bid and ask prices.
Denition 2 (Herding - Contrarianism). A trader with signal i engages in herd behavior
at time t if he buys when V i0 (
i) < V m0 < V
m
t or if he sells when V
i
0 (
i) > V m0 > V
m
t ; and
buying (or selling) is strictly preferred to other actions.
A trader with signal i engages in contrarian behavior if he buys when V i0 (
i) < V m0 and
V mt < V
m
0 , and if he sells when V
i
0 (
i) > V m0 and V
m
t > V
m
0 ; and buying buying (or selling) is
strictly preferred to other actions.
As AZ point out, for herd buying to occur three things need to happen: without observing
any trading history, the trader sells at t = 0; the history of trades must be positive and, despite
of the increase in price the trader must be willing to buy after having observed the trading
history. Herding can be interpreted as a situation where the price has not moved as much as
the traders valuation after observing a positive trading history. Correspondingly, for contrarian
buying to occur, the trader needs to be wanting to sell at t = 0, and to buy after observing a
trading history that leads to a decrease in the price. Contrarianism is the consequence of the
price reacting too much to the trading history compared to the tradersvaluation. In general,
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path-dependent behavior. is triggered when traders who would have followed their signal at
t = 0 observe the unfolding of specic trading history paths and change in their behavior.
2.1 TradersUpdating and Market Makers Pricing Rule
TradersUpdating As we use the convention according to which informed traders receive
a signal only when called to trade, before their turn comes all of the traders have the same
valuation of the asset at each point in time, for there is no informational asymmetry among
them. In particular, they all agree on whether the conditions for a path-dependent behavior
have arised. Consider the case of herding (the same reasoning holds for the case of contrarian
behavior). Since traders di¤er only by their signal, once one of them herds, all of them would
be herding. It follows that a type I trader who is observed herding at t does not release any
information to the other traders, so that V it = V
i
t 1 for every i. Similarly, if the conditions
for herding are in place and a type II trader is observed, his actions are uninformative as well
because he is either a herding informed trader or a noise trader.
Whenever the traders observe a type I trade and there is no possibility for herd behavior,
then it is as if they could observe each others signals. In case they receive a high signal as well
as if they observe a type I buy in absence of herding, traders update their valuation according
to:
V it = E

V j Ft; Tt; i = H

=
pV it
pV it + (1  p) (1  V it )
. (8)
We can conclude that what matters for the tradersvaluation is the number of non-path-
dependent buys and sells. Indicate with ht and lt the numbers of high and low signals implicitly
observed(through the trades of type I traders) up to time t, and with bit and s
i
t the number
of type II buys and sells observed up to time t. Then, for every i,
V it =
pht lt


2
+ (1  ) pbit sit
pht lt


2
+ (1  ) pbit sit + (1  p)ht lt 
2
+ (1  ) (1  p)bit sit : (9)
Market Makers Pricing Rule We have already established that the market maker xes
bid and ask prices given the history of trades and the eventuality he will face a sell or a buy
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order respectively, as formalized by (4). In general, the market maker sets the prices conditional
on the tradersstrategies. Without the possibility of path dependent behavior, the strategy of
an informed trader is to buy upon the reception of a high signal and to sell upon the reception of
a low signal. If there are the conditions for herding, though, an informed trader buys regardless
of his signal.
We say that the market maker is naiveif he sets bid and ask prices assuming that every
informed trader follows his signal even when the conditions for path-dependent behavior are
in place. Correspondingly, we will indicate the bid and ask prices of a naive market maker at
time t with Bnaivet and A
naive
t respectively. These prices satisfy:
Anaivet = E

V j Ft; V it
 Ft; Tt; i = H > Anaivet  ,
Bnaivet = E

V j Ft; V it
 Ft; Tt; i = L > Bnaivet  .
On the other hand, a sophisticated market maker is aware of the possibility of herding or
contrarianism. He rst checks whether by xing Bt = Bnaivet and At = A
naive
t traders are going
to engage in path-dependent behavior at those prices and, if this is not the case, those are the
prices he actually posts. However, if he nds that at those prices there is room for herding or
contrarianism, he revises them to take into account this eventuality. In equilibrium, the ask
and the bid price of a sophisticated market maker satisfy
At = E [V j Ft; at = buy] = E

V j Ft; V it
 Ft; Tt; i > At ;
Bt = E [V j Ft; at = sell] = E

V j Ft; V it
 Ft; Tt; i < Bt ;
where the rst equality follows from the assumption of perfect competition and the second
equality from the assumption of rational expectations.
In what follows we are going to focus on the ask price: we will rst compute the price posted
by the market maker under the assumption of perfect competition, and then we will check that
this is in fact a rational expectation price.
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Example 1. To x ideas, consider the very simple case where t = 2 andF3 = f(B; V m1 ) ; (B; V m2 )g.
Suppose that up until t = 3 no possibility of path-dependency arised so that the prices of a
naive and sophisticated market maker coincide, namely, their valuation is equal to
V m2 = E [V j F3] =


2
+ (1  ) p2

2
+ (1  ) p2 + 
2
+ (1  ) (1  p)2 :
The trading history F3 is compatible with four type-signal histories,
Gj3	4j=1:
F3z }| {
(B;B)
!
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
(( = 1; B) ; ( = 1; B))
(( = 1; B) ; ( = 0; B))
(( = 0; B) ; ( = 1; B))
(( = 0; B) ; ( = 0; B))| {z }
 G13
 G23
 G33
 G43Gj3	4j=1
Indicate with E

V j Gj3

the evaluation of a trader who has observed Gj3. Then,
E

V j G13

=
p2
p2 + (1  p)2 = V i2 ;
E

V j G23

= E

V j G33

=
p


2
+ (1  ) p
p


2
+ (1  ) p+ (1  p) 
2
+ (1  ) (1  p) ;
E

V j G43

=


2
+ (1  ) p2

2
+ (1  ) p2 + 
2
+ (1  ) (1  p)2 :
Suppose that p,  and  are such that, if G13 is realized and the market maker sets A3 =
Anaive3 , an informed agent selected to trade at t = 3 is going to herd, i.e. a trader with a low
signal is going to buy. Then, in face of a buy at t = 3, a sophisticated market maker needs to
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consider the following scenarios:
(B;B;B)!
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
G13
%
!
&
L
H
noise
G23 ;G33 ;G43
%
&
H
noise
For every type-signal path compatible with F3, not only the market maker needs to account
for the possibility that the buy order comes from an informed trader with a high signal or a
noise trader, but also he needs to take into consideration that on G13 an informed trader with a
low signal is going to buy as well. 
We are now going to generalize what illustrated in the previous example to the case where
path-dependent behavior occurs for the rst time at a generic t. Set
 = f( = 0; B) ; ( = 0; S) ; ( = 1; B) ; ( = 1; S)g
to be the type-signal space and T =
QT
t=1 t, where t =  for every t, the set of all possible
T -dimensional vectors of type-signal sequences. Call G the algebra on T and fGtg its generic
ltration.
At time t, without the possibility of path-dependent behavior, the trading history Ft is com-
patible with 2t type-signal histories
Gjt	2tj=1 as shown below, where we indicate with E V j Gjt 
the valuation of a trader who sawGjt at time t.
Ft !
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
G1t
G2t
...
G2tt
! E [V j G1t ]
! E [V j G2t ]
...
! E V j G2tt 
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The tradersvaluations along the Gjt paths depend on the number and the type of buys and
sells in absence of herd behavior as specied in (9). In particular, the higher the number of
high signals implicitly observed or the number of type II sells, the bigger the gap E

V j Gjt
 
E [V j Ft] and the easier for path-dependent buying to occur. For any trading history, in
absence of past herding or contrarian possibilities, there is a unique Gjt such that E
h
V j Gjt
i
=
maxj E

V j Gjt

, which is associated with the path where all buys are type I buys and all sells
are type II sells. If path-dependent buying occurs for the rst time at t, it will happen on the
path Gjt : if bt > st we observe herd buying, while if bt < st we observe contrarian buying. It
follows that, in deriving the ask price for the case of rst time path-dependent buying, we only
need to consider one possible type-signal path leading to it and the associated value for the
traders onthat path, value that we indicate with V Bt 1 = E
h
V j Gjt
i
.
Dene the measure t :
Gjt	j ! [0; 1] to be the probability of the type-signal history that
leads to the type-signal set Gjt , given that we reached Ft. The probability of a single type-
signal history vector it is simply the probability of r successes in t Bernoulli trials, where r is
the number of Type I trades in the vector:
Pr
 Gjt j Ft = tr

[Pr ( = 0)]t r [Pr ( = 1)]r .
Dene, at each time t, the probability of the type-signal history corresponding to the maximal
valuation V Bt 1 as
Bt = Pr

Gjt j Ft

=

t
bt

[Pr ( = 0)]t bt [Pr ( = 1)]bt ,
where [Pr ( = 0)] =  and [Pr ( = 1)] = 1  .
Proposition 1 Consider a trading history Ft such that, given p,  and , no path-dependent
behavior could have occurred until time t. Moreover, suppose that, on the maximal type-signal
history Gjt compatible with Ft; an informed trader buys regardless of his signal. Then, market
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makers expected value of the asset given a buy order at t is given by:
E [V j Ft; at = buy] (10)
=


2
+ (1  ) pV mt 1 + Bt (1  ) (1  p)V Bt 1

2
+ (1  ) pV mt 1 + (1  p)  1  V mt 1+ Bt (1  ) (1  p)V Bt 1 + p  1  V Bt 1 :
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The market maker updates in a normalway along all the type-signal paths, attributing
a buy (sell) order either to a high (low) signal or to noise, while on the path leading to path-
dependent buying he also updates as if the trader received a low signal, (1  ) (1  p)V Bt 1,
times the probability of that path given the trading history.
By construction, (10) satises the zero prot condition of the market maker. The next
proposition states that, by setting At = E [V j Ft; at = buy], the market maker cannot prevent
herding or contrarianism from happening, even if he accounts for this possibility in his pricing
rule. This makes At the competitive rational expectation equilibrium price.
Proposition 2 Consider a trading history Ft and a type-signal history Gjt compatible with it
such that V it
 Gjt ; i = L > ANaivet . Then,
V it
 Gjt ; i = L > E [V j Ft; at = buy] :
The converse is also true. Hence, At = E [V j Ft; at = buy] is a rational expectation equilibrium
price.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
One might be tempted to think that the previous result is driven by the fact that the price
of a sophisticated market maker needs to be lower than the price of a naive market maker
because the former is accounting for both a high and a low signal driving the buy order on
Gjt . This last intuition is true, but it is only part of the story: a buy order makes Gj

t and
its associated high prior V Bt 1 more likely in the eyes of the market maker, inducing an overall
increase of his valuation. In general we always have that At > Anaivet :
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Proposition 3 Consider a trading history Ft and a type-signal history Gjt compatible with it
such that E

V j Gjt ; i = L

> ANaivet . Then At > A
naive
t . The converse is also true.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
We have established that E
h
V j Gjt ; i = L
i
> At > A
naive
t . This is easily interpreted if we
observe that, by moving from the highest of the valuations to the lowest, we are losingsome-
thing either at the level of information or at the level of rationality. In fact, ifE
h
V j Gjt ; i = L
i
is the valuation of a fully informed and fully rational agent, At is the valuation of a partially
informed and fully rational agent, to conclude with Anaivet , which is the valuation of a partially
informed and partially rational agent.
One consequence of these results is that, at every time period t, investigating the conditions
for path-dependent behavior under the pricing rule of a naive market maker is equivalent to
studying the same market under a sophisticated market maker. This does not mean that using
the pricing rule of a market maker who is always naive is equivalent to using the pricing rule of
a market maker who is not. The simplication is used to check conditions at a specic t, not
as the market makers pricing rule over time.
3 Herding and Contrarian Behavior
In this section we study the case of path-dependent behavior occurring for the rst time at
t, so when we talk about informed trading up to the herding/contrarian time t, we are assuming
that those traders are following their signal. Typically, in the literature, the reasoning to prove
the existence of herd behavior goes as follows: in nite time any trading history has positive
probability; noise trading can always generate trading histories compatible with herding, hence
the existence of herding. In this model, type-signal realizations are as important for herding
as the trading history they are compatible with. This implies that we will not be able to
appeal to noise trading generating any possible trading history in order to prove the existence
of herding. In fact, noise can generate trading histories whose compatible type-signal histories
meet the conditions for herding, but the very fact of assuming noise to generate those histories
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rules out herding. We can conclude that noise can generate trading histories such that the
market maker attaches a positive probability to the eventuality of herding at some time t; but
if the trading history at t were in fact caused by noise, then herding would not be possible.
However, consistency requires that if the market maker deems some trading history compatible
with herding, then there must exist a type-signal path leading to it. On the other hand, noise
can lead to contrarianism, as during the realization of type II trades the price moves too much
for the amount of information actually present in the market.
The proof of the existence of path-dependent behavior is achieved in two steps: rst, in
Theorem 1, we establish conditions on p,  and ; involving both the trading history and
the compatible type-signal realizations, under which herd and contrarian buying occur with
probability one; then, in Theorem 2, we prove that trading histories satisfying the conditions
for path-dependency exist with positive probability.
Herd buying is a consequence of the delay, due to the presence of noise, with which the
market maker reacts to a positive history of type I buys. However, traders advantage in
observing the nature of trading is not per se su¢ cient to generate herd behavior. Consider
1   vis à vis (ht + lt) =t as the level of imbalance between theoretical informed trading and
observed informed trading in the history up to t. Not all observed informed trades exceeding
their theoretical frequency have an impact in causing price rigidity. In fact, if jht   ltj is
steadily low, although there might be a big discrepancy between observed and theoretical
frequencies of informed trading, type I buys and sells balance out, and the price does not need
to adjust too much (on average) so that price rigidity has no bite. If jht   ltj gets high, then the
imbalance starts to matter, and a high theoretical noise will cause price rigidity. Everything
else equal, herd buying occurs when a relative high number of type I high signals is realized.
Correspondingly, contrarian buying is a consequence of the excess of informational content the
market maker assigns to a string of type II sells. This is once again due to the possibility for
the traders to observe their colleagues types: the share of informed type II traders is only
1  , while the market maker believes that any trade has a probability 1    1   to be
informed. Similarly we have observed for type I trades, what matters is the magnitude of the
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di¤erence jbit   sitj and not the absolute value of type II sells.
In Theorem 1 we nd that it is easier for a well-informed market (i.e. a market where
the quality p of information is high) to engage in path-dependent behavior than it is for a
poorly-informed market. Intuitively, for any level of noise and type composition, the higher
the signals precision the bigger the e¤ect of the asymmetry of information between the traders
and the market maker. This is because the di¤erence in informational content of a type I
trade (correspondingly, the di¤erence in the scarcity of information of a type II trade) between
traders and market maker is much higher when the signal is very precise. It follows that a long
enough sequence of type I buys or type II sells is going to make the di¤erence in valuations
V it 1   V mt 1 increase more the higher the precision.
There is a trade o¤ between building up, between periods 0 and t  1; a gap V it 1 V mt 1 big
enough for herd or contrarian buying to occur at t and, given prior valuations V it 1 and V
m
t 1
having the best conditions for path-dependent buying to occur at t. We have already noticed
that the gap grows bigger the higher the precision. At the same time, though, we would like
valuations not to react too much to the new information at time t: we would like V it 1 not
to decrease too much upon the reception of a low signal, and V mt 1 not to increase too much
upon observing a buy, so that the gap stays positive and an agent receiving a low signal at t
buys. The situation just described, where V it 1   V mt 1 is preserved at t, is easier to achieve the
lower the precision of the signal. The following theorem states that, in any circumstance, the
trade o¤ is at the advantage of a high precision signal: it is easier for a high precision signal to
accumulate a big enough gap V it 1   V mt 1 such that at time t it will not be reverted by a low
realization of the signal and a buy order, than to build the gap itself with a low precision signal.
By easierwe mean that it takes a shorter sequence of type I buys or type II sells, and that it
is more likely that any given trading history Ft will result in path-dependent behavior. It also
means that, for a long enough positive (negative) history of type I (II) trades, herd (contrarian)
buying occurs earlier with a high precision signal.
To ease notation, indicate with L the log-likelihood ratio between V = 1 and V = 0 for a
trader upon the (implicit) observation of a high signal, with L the log-likelihood ratio between
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V = 1 and V = 0 for a trader upon the observation of a type II buy, and with L the log-
likelihood ratio between V = 1 and V = 0 for the market maker upon the reception of a buy
order. Formally,
L =
Pr (V = 1 j at = buy,  t = 1)
Pr (V = 0 j at = buy,  t = 1) ;
L =
Pr (V = 1 j at = buy,  t = 0)
Pr (V = 0 j at = buy,  t = 0) ;
L =
Pr (V = 1 j at = buy)
Pr (V = 0 j at = buy) :
It is easy to check that L  L  L for every p,  and .
Theorem 1 (Conditions for Path-Dependent Behavior) Consider a trading history Ft
such that no path-dependent behavior could have occurred before t and such that
ht 1   lt 1 > L+ L

L  L +
 
bit 1   sit 1
 L   L
L  L (11)
Then,
1. If ht 1  lt 1 < 2   1 +
 
bit 1   sit 1
  
1

  1 there exists a cuto¤ level 1
2
< p (; ) < 1
such that for 1 > p > p (; ) path-dependent buying occurs at t;
2. If ht 1  lt 1  2 1+
 
bit 1   sit 1
  
1

  1 path-dependent buying occurs at t for every
value of p 2  1
2
; 1

.
Moreover, we have that @p

@
< 0 if and only if bmt > s
m
t , whereas
@p
@
< 0 for any Ft leading
to path-dependent behavior.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
As already mentioned, a high p has the e¤ect of increasing the informational asymmetry
between the traders and the market maker. In fact, as L  L, a higher p increases, in presence
of noise, the informational content of type I trades more to the traders than to the market
maker: coeteris paribus, a smaller ht is needed to generate herd buying. In a similar fashion,
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since L  L, a higher p increases the informational content of a type II trade more to the
market maker than to the traders and, coeteris paribus, a smaller st is needed to generate
contrarian buying.
When p = 1, the signal perfectly reveals the value of the asset, which also implies that
signals are all the same. Conditional on V = 1, the gap in valuations between the traders and
the market maker is always (weakly) positive, and informed traders all act alike not because
they are herding but because they all receive the same, perfectly revealing information.
When p = 1
2
the signal is completely uninformative and traders do not learn anything from
it or by observing the other market participantsbehavior. The price remains equal to 0 and
since traders are indi¤erent between buying and selling, we can assume that they simply follow
their signal. However, no learning takes place.
The overall e¤ect of  is to make the market makers pricing mechanism less reactive to
the trading history. Price stickiness is benecial in order to generate herding, as the gapV it 1   V mt 1 is caused mainly by type I trade, but it makes the occurrence of contrarianism
more di¢ cult, as the gap increases following a preponderance of type II trades. Hence, if the
condition for path-dependent buying (11) is consistent with herding, which requires bmt > s
m
t ,
then we observe that the cut-o¤ p above which a trader buys with a low signal decreases with
: even lower levels of the signal precision are compatible with herd behavior. At the same
time, if path dependent buying occurs when bmt < s
m
t , an increase in  causes the minimum
level of precision p above which contrarianism takes place to increase.
The e¤ect of noise trading is always benecial to the occurrence of path-dependency: in
case of herding, it dampens the market makers price adjustment to type I trading, while in
case of contrarianism it makes the price too reactive to type II trading. It follows that, for any
given trading history satisfying condition (11) an increase in the mass of noise traders increases
the set of values for the signal precision leading to path dependency.
Theorem 2 (Existence of Path-Dependent Behavior) For p 2 1
2
; 1
	
path-dependent
behavior does not occur for any trading history Ft and any ;  2 [0; 1]. For p 2
 
1
2
; 1

and for
every 1 > ;  > 0; price paths with path-dependent behavior occur with positive probability. In
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particular, path-dependency occurs with positive probability for the rst time at t whenever Ft
is such that
bmt 1 
L+ L
L  L   s
m
t 1
L   L
L  L : (12)
Proof. See appendix A.5.
For an intuition of Theorem 2, consider the simple case in which the market opens with a
string of bmt 1 type I buys in the rst t  1 periods. Then ht 1 = bmt 1 and if at t an individual
with a low signal is called to trade, he will herd at t for given values of p and  if bmt 1 
L + L

=

L  L. Suppose, instead, that the market opens with a string of smt 1 type II sells
in the rst t   1 periods. Then, an individual with a low signal who is called to trade at t
engages in contrarian buying if smt 1 

L+ L

=

L   L.
Indicate with dxe the smallest integer greater than x. The minimum amount of time that
is needed for the possibility of herd buying to realize given some values of p and  is equal to
th =

2L
L  L

;
whereas, the minimum amount of time that is needed for the possibility of contrarian buying
to realize is equal to
tc =

2L + L  L
L   L

:
It is easy to show that there exists a threshold  (p; ) such that th < (>) t

c when  > (<)
.
This is clearly related to the fact that @p

@
< 0 if and only if bmt > s
m
t and it is a complementary
result: for any level of p and for any given trading history, herding occurs faster when prices
are stickier, while contrarianism occurs faster if, coeteris paribus, prices move too much.
Concurrently, a low  facilitates the price alignment to the tradersvaluation following a period
of type I trades which slows down the possibility of herding. In both cases, @t

h
@p
< 0 and @t

c
@p
< 0:
both herding and contrarian behavior are more likely to happen earlier for higher levels of the
signal precision.
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4 Reconciling with Avery and Zemsky
In this section we are going to reconcile the results of Theorem 1 with those already found in the
literature. In particular, we are going to show that, if we take prior evaluations V it 1 and V
m
t 1
as given, herding at time t is easier to achieve for low levels of the signals precision as stated
in [1]. In this respect, we isolate herding from any other path dependent phenomena, and we
make the assumption that the only path-dependent behavior arising at t at the ask price At is
herd buying. Moreover, in line with AZs results, we look for conditions for herding to occur
at a generic time t regardless of whether other path-dependent behaviors could have occurred
already in the trading history. In order to do this, we need to make sure we can still use (10)
as the correct ask price. In fact, when the possibility of herding arises for the rst time, the
herding type-signal path and hence the tradersvaluation attached to it is unique. However,
when the possibility of herding has already occurred in the past, new herding paths might not
be unique and more than one valuation along those paths might be taken into account when
forming the ask price. The next result establishes that, although herding paths are not unique,
they must share the same valuation of the asset, allowing us to use the same formulation as
in (10) for a generic ask price at t when the only path-dependent behavior we need to worry
about is herding.
To x ideas, consider again the simple case of F3 = fB;Bg leading to the possibility of
herd buying at t = 3. In fact, if the correct type-signal path is G13 ; traders do not update their
beliefs at t = 3, as the agent trading is either herding or he is a noise trader. If there is still an
opportunity for herd buying at time four, the tradersprior valuation at t = 4 is the same as
in the previous period. If the correct type-signal path is not G13 , then traders on path G13 and
those emanating from paths G23 and G33 who observed a type I buy at t = 3 will have the same
prior at the beginning of t = 4. With this logic in mind, we can state the next proposition.
Proposition 4 If there is the possibility that agents with prior V it 1are herding at t on Gjt for
some j, then all the herding agents have prior V it 1 for every j.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
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Proposition 4 shows that, at the beginning of t+ 1, following the possibility of herd buying
at t on Gjt , the tradersvaluation on the paths emanating from Gjt continues to be V it 1: whether
they observed a type I or a type II trader at t they would not update their prior, as all informed
traders would be herding. Moreover, traders on the paths where the number of type I buys
is one less than in Gjt update their valuation upon observing an informed buy t. Then, at the
beginning of t+ 1, this valuation is aligned to the one of traders coming from Gjt , and which is
equal to V it 1. Hence, V
i
t 1 remains the highest tradersprior valuation at the beginning of time
t+1: In fact, V it 1 remains the highest tradersprior valuation throughout all the periods where
there is the possibility of herd buying, whereas both V mt 1 and the probability t of being on the
type-signal path leading to herding increase. It follows that the formula used for the ask price
for the case of rst time herding is in fact a general formula for the ask price at any period, the
only things changing over time being V mt 1 and t, with V
i
t = V
i
t 1 whenever t 1 > 0.
Having just claried the way the market maker updates his beliefs given the possible type-
signal scenarios compatible with the trading history, it comes natural to explain here why
informational cascades cannot occur in this market. An informational cascade means that
nobody updates anymore, not even the market maker. The latter does not update when he
thinks that the probability of an action is independent of the state of the world. For instance,
in a cascade the market maker might believe that all the informed traders are buying and all
sell orders come from noise traders. For this to occur, the market maker needs to believe that
on all the type-signal paths informed traders are doing the same thing. However, there will
always be paths were a buy does not mean herding and hence a sell does not mean noise. For
this reason an informational cascade cannot happen.
Using (10), we can state and prove the following theorem, which delivers conditions for herd
buying stated, analogously to AZ, as a function of posterior beliefs.
Theorem 3 Suppose that the trading history at t is such that V it 1 > V
m
t 1. Then there exist
a cut o¤ level p
 
; ; V it 1; V
m
t 1

such that traders engage in herd buying if and only if p <
p
 
; ; V it 1; V
m
t 1

:
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
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The rst thing to notice is that we have a cut o¤ level p
 
; ; V it 1; V
m
t

below which herd
buying occurs. This is because, given the priors V it 1 and V
m
t 1 such that V
i
t 1 > V
m
t 1, a low
precision of the signal decreases traders valuation less upon the reception of a low signal and
make herd buying easier. However, for any Ft such that V it 1 > V mt 1, the di¤erence V it 1 V mt 1 is
larger the higher the precision p. Consider, in fact, the extreme case where p = 1
2
: the precision
is the lowest possible, however, V it 1 = V
m
t 1 for every ,  and any Ft. When p = 12 neither
the market maker nor the traders change their beliefs over time and herding is impossible (no
action is strictly preferred to any other action).
Consider the case where herding occurred for the rst time at t. Then V it = V
i
t 1, while the
market makers prior valuation at t + 1 has increased to V mt = At. Proposition 2 ensures that
V it 1 > V
m
t , and that at t+ 1 we just need to check whether A
naive
t+1 < E

V j Gjt+1; i = L

. The
proof of the theorem shows that this condition is equivalent to
t+1 (p) = p
2
 
V it 1   V mt

(1  ) +  V it 1   V it 1V mt 1  2

(13)
+p

2
 
V it 1   V mt
  2p  V it 1   V mt V it 11  2

> 0.
The theorem guarantees that there exists a cut o¤p
 
; ; V it 1; V
m
t

such that, when V it 1 > V
m
t ,
t+1 (p) > 0 for p < p
 
; ; V it 1; V
m
t

. Moreover, it is easy to check that when V it 1 = V
m
t ;
p
 
; ; V it 1; V
m
t

< 1
2
, so condition (13) can never be satised when p = 1
2
: If p
 
; ; V it 1; V
m
t

<
p (; ) herding stops with t. If p
 
; ; V it 1; V
m
t

> p > p (; ) then herding continues at
t+ 1, and at the beginning of t+ 2 the priors will be V mt+1 = At+1 and V
i
t+1 = V
i
t 1. In general,
as @p
@Vmt
< 0, at each herding period the cut o¤ level of precision below which herding continues
decreases.
5 Discussion
Although we have derived all our results for the case of path-dependent buying, it is clear
that the case of path-dependent selling follows symmetrically. In particular, the equivalent of
27
condition (11) for path-dependent selling is
lt 1   ht 1 > L+ L

L  L +
 
sit 1   bit 1
 L   L
L  L ,
while the minimum waiting time for the rst possibility of herd and contrarian selling are still
equal to th and t

c respectively. Moreover, whether the rst instance of herd selling occurs earlier
or later than contrarian selling depends on the same threshold  (p; ) found for the case of
buying.
We would like to know how the market price behaves in the long run. In particular, we
are interested in the informational properties of the price in our market, where the private
information about types leads to path dependency, compared to a market where traders always
follow their signal. In this respect, consider a market which is identical to the one we have
been studying so far with the exception that traders cannot observe each others types: this is
simply a market à la Glosten and Milgrom, where the intermediate layer of information which
is common knowledge only among traders is shut down. Indeed, in a GM market traders always
follow their signal. We would like to know whether the price in our market is a better or a
worse predictor of the true value of the asset compared to a market à la GM.
For this purpose, indicate with V ar
 
V j V GMt

= GMt
 
1  GMt

the variance of the value
of the asset after having observed the realized price in a market where traders have no infor-
mation about types, where GMt is the probability that the true state is V = 1 at t in such a
market. We would like to compare this with V ar (V j V mt ) = mt (1  mt ). It is clear then that
the price is more informative the higher (or lower) is mt .
Assuming V = 1, mt > 
GM
t if and only if the occurrence of path-dependent buying is
more frequent than the occurrence of path-dependent selling. This for two reasons: the rst
reason lies in the fact that path-dependent buying hideslow signals, whereas it does not alter
the tradersbehavior compared to a GM market when a high signal is realized; moreover, as
we have seen in Proposition 3, the price is more volatile in periods of path-dependent trading
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which reduces2 the conditional volatility of V even further.
When V = 1, the incidence of herd buying is naturally higher than the incidence of herd
selling, whereas the incidence of contrarian selling is higher than the incidence of contrarian
buying. Then, to make path-dependent buying more likely than path-dependent selling, the
share of type II trades , which is responsible for contrarianism, needs to be small enough3.
We can (roughly and perhaps not surprisingly) conclude that V ar (V j V mt ) is smaller than
V ar
 
V j V GMt

when the share of type I traders is high: then, being able to observe traders
types is very informative and it leads to herding. By suppressing the opinion of the minority,
given that the majority is correct in the limit, herding pushes the market closer to the true
value of the asset. When the market is mostly composed of type II traders, the conditional
variance of the state given the realized price is lower in a GM-type of market. In fact, the ability
to observe types induces traders to attribute too much noise to the type II trading activity in
a non-neutral way. For instance, when V = 1 more high signals than low signals moving the
type II trading activity are thought to likely be noise, which in turns leads to more frequent
contrarian selling and the hiding of high signals.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose that at t the rst possibility of herd/contrarian buying arises on Gjt , where j 2 arg maxj Ei
h
V j Gjt
i
and
n
Gjt
o
j
is the family of type-signal histories at time t compatible with Ft. We know that j is unique,
namely that the argmax is a singleton, Indicate with V it 1 the valuation of the asset by a trader i who has
observed Gjt . We can write the market makers valuation of the asset as the weighted sum of the value of the
asset along the paths
n
Gjt
o
j
with weights given by the probability of each of the paths given the trading history.
2Vives ([6], p.131) proves that V ar (V mt ) = V ar (V )  V ar (V j V mt ).
3Notice that we can have th < tc and at the same time have contrarianism more likely than herding: th and
tc indicate how fast herding and contrarianism can occur, not how likely they are.
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We can then rewrite V mt 1 as
V mt 1 = E [V j Ft] = Pr (V = 1 j Ft) =
Pr (Ft j V = 1) Pr (V = 1)
Pr (Ft)
=
P
i Pr
 Git j V = 1Pr (V = 1)
Pr (Ft)
=
P
i
Pr(V=1jGit)Pr(Git)
Pr(V=1) Pr (V = 1)
Pr (F3) =
P
i Pr
 
V = 1 j Git

Pr
 Git
Pr (Ft) (14)
Using the fact that Pr
 Ft j Git = 1,
Pr
 Git j FtPr (Ft) = Pr  Ft j GitPr  Git = Pr  Git .
It follows that
Pr
 Git
Pr (Ft) = Pr
 Git j Ft (15)
and we can re-write (14) as
V mt 1 =
X
i
Pr
 
V = 1 j Git

Pr
 Git j Ft : (16)
To ease notation, we use at = B to indicate a buy. Using the law of conditional expectations and Bayesrule
we can write (4) as
Pr (V = 1 j at = B;Ft) = Pr (Ft; at = B; V = 1)
Pr (at = B;Ft) ;
=
Pr (at = B;Ft; V = 1)
Pr (at = B;Ft; V = 1) + Pr (at = B;Ft; V = 0) ;
=
Pr (Ft j at = B; V = 1) Pr (at = B; V = 1)
Pr (Ft j at = B; V = 1) Pr (at = B; V = 1) + Pr (Ft j at = B; V = 0) Pr (at; V = 0) :
Since
Git	i partitionsFt,
Pr (V = 1 j at = B;Ft)
=
P2t
i=1 Pr
 Git j at = B; V = 1Pr (at = B; V = 1)P2t
i=1

Pr
 Git j at = B; V = 1Pr (at = B; V = 1) + Pr  Git j at = B; V = 0Pr (at = B; V = 0) ;
=
P2t
i=1 Pr
 
at = B j V = 1;Git

Pr
 
V = 1 j Git

Pr
 GitP2t
i=1

Pr
 
at = B j V = 1;Git

Pr
 
V = 1 j Git

Pr
 Git+ Pr  at = B j V = 0;GitPr  V = 0 j GitPr  Git :
Dividing both the numerator and the denominator by Pr (Ft) and using (14), the numerator can be written
as
2tX
i=1
Pr
 
at = B j V = 1;Git

Pr
 
V = 1 j Git

Pr
 Git j Ft : (17)
On Gjt , the probability of a buy order di¤ers from the probability in other type-signal paths, as traders herd
and buy regardless of their signal. In particular,
Pr
 
at = B j V = 1;Git

=


2
+ (1  ) p

for i 6= j;
Pr
 
at = B j V = 1;Git

=


2
+ (1  ) (p+ 1  p)

for i = j:
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We can the rewrite (17) as


2
+ (1  ) p
 2tX
i=1
Pr
 
V = 1 j Git

Pr
 Git j Ft| {z }
Vmt 1
+ (1  ) (1  p) Pr

V = 1 j Gjt

| {z }
V Bt 1
Pr

Gjt j Ft

:
It follows that
Pr (V = 1 j at = B;Ft)
=
h

2 + (1  ) p
i
V mt 1 + (1  ) (1  p)V Bt 1Bth

2 + (1  ) p
i
V mt 1 + (1  ) (1  p)V Bt 1Bt +
h

2 + (1  ) p
i
V mt 1 + (1  ) p
 
1  V Bt 1

Bt
where Bt = Pr

Gjt j Ft

is the probability of the path leading to herding/contrarianism. Q.E.D.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
V it

Gjt ; i = L

> ANaivet is equivalent to
(1  p)V it 1
(1  p)V it 1 + p
 
1  V it 1
 >
h

2 + (1  ) p
i
V mt 1

2 + (1  )

pV mt 1 + (1  p)
 
1  V mt 1
 ;
rearranging,
(1  p)V it 1


2
+ (1  ) pV mt 1 + (1  p)  1  V mt 1 > (1  p)V it 1 + p  1  V it 1 2 + (1  ) p

V mt 1:
Adding t (1  ) (1  p)V it 1

(1  p)V it 1 + p
 
1  V it 1
	
to both sides,
(1  p)V it 1


2
+ (1  ) pV mt 1 + (1  p)  1  V mt 1+ t (1  ) (1  p)V it 1 + p  1  V it 1
>

(1  p)V it 1 + p
 
1  V it 1

2
+ (1  ) p

V mt 1 + t (1  ) (1  p)V it 1

:
Rearranging,
(1  p)V it 1
(1  p)V it 1 + p
 
1  V it 1

>
h

2 + (1  ) p
i
V mt 1 + t (1  ) (1  p)V it 1

2 + (1  )

pV mt 1 + (1  p)
 
1  V mt 1

+ t (1  )

(1  p)V it 1 + p
 
1  V it 1
	 ;
which is equivalent to V it

Gjt ; i = L

> E [V j Ft; at = buy]. Hence, At = E [V j Ft; at = buy] is a rational
expectations price. Q.E.D.
31
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
At > A
naive
t is equivalent to h

2 + (1  ) p
i
V mt 1 + t (1  ) (1  p)V it 1

2 + (1  )

pV mt 1 + (1  p)
 
1  V mt 1

+ t (1  )

(1  p)V it 1 + p
 
1  V it 1
	
>
h

2 + (1  ) p
i
V mt 1

2 + (1  )

pV mt 1 + (1  p)
 
1  V mt 1
 :
Rearranging, 

2
+ (1  ) pV mt 1 + (1  p)  1  V mt 1 t (1  ) (1  p)V it 1
> t (1  )

(1  p)V it 1 + p
 
1  V it 1
	 
2
+ (1  ) p

V mt 1;
which is equivalent to
(1  p)V it 1
(1  p)V it 1 + p
 
1  V it 1
 >
h

2 + (1  ) p
i
V mt 1

2 + (1  )

pV mt 1 + (1  p)
 
1  V mt 1
 ;
which concludes the proof. Q.E.D.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 1
Herd buying occurs when E

V j Ft; Tt; i = L

> At. By proposition (2), this is equivalent to E

V j Ft; Tt; i = L

>
Anaivet which, in the case of rst time herding, can be written as
p(ht 1 lt 1 1)


2 + (1  ) p
bit 1 sit 1
p(ht 1 lt 1 1)


2 + (1  ) p
bit 1 sit 1 + (1  p)(ht 1 lt 1 1) 2 + (1  ) (1  p)bit 1 sit 1 (18)
>
h

2 + (1  ) p
ibmt 1 smt 1+1
h

2 + (1  ) p
ibmt 1 smt 1+1
+
h

2 + (1  ) (1  p)
ibmt 1 smt 1+1 :
As long as no path-dependent behavior has occurred yet, given the number of and type of buys and sells,
their sequence does not change the market makers and traders valuations at t. Setting t = ht 1   lt 1,
it = b
i
t 1   sit 1, mt = bmt 1   smt 1 and t = t 1t+1 and
K (p) =
242 + (1  ) p
h

2 + (1  ) (1  p)
i


2 + (1  ) (1  p)
 h

2 + (1  ) p
i
35
it
t+1
;
the previous condition is equivalent to

 
p; ; ; t; 
i
t

= pt

2
K (p) + pt (1  p) (1  )K (p)  (1  p)t 
2
  (1  p)t (1  ) p > 0:
Notice that 0 < K (p)  1 for every p 2  12 ; 1. As K   12 = 1; we have that    12 = 0 and  (1) > 0 for
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every , , t and 
i
t. The derivative of  with respect to p is
0
 
p; ; t; 
i
t

= tp
t 1
2
K (p) + pt

2
K 0 (p) + tp
t 1 (1  p) (1  )K (p)  pt (1  )K (p)
+pt (1  p) (1  )K 0 (p) + t (1  p)t 1

2
  (1  p)t (1  ) + t (1  p)t 1 (1  ) p:
At p = 12 this is equal to
0

1
2
; ; ; t; 
i
t

=

1
2
t 1(
t   (1  ) 
it
t + 1
 (1  )
)
;
whose sign behaves as follows:
0

1
2

 0 when t  2

  1 + it

1

  1

;
0

1
2

< 0 when t <
2

  1 + it

1

  1

:
The function 
 
p; ; ; t; 
i
t

= 0 implicitly denes t = 't
 
p; ; ; it

, everywhere but at
 
1
2 ; ; ; 
i
t

. We can
nd 't
 
p; ; ; it

explicitly:
't
 
p; ; ; it

=
L+ L
L  L + 
i
t
L   L
L  L : (19)
Dene l = @L=@p. Di¤erentiating (19) we respect to p we nd:
@'t
@p
=
 
l + l
  
L  L   L + L  l   l+ it  l   l  L  L   l   l  L   L
(L  L)2
The sing of @'t@p depends on the value of 
i
t. In particular,
@'
@p is positive if and only if
it < 2
lL   lL
lL  lL   l (L  L) + L (l   l) = D (p; ; ) ;
where D (p; ; ) < 0 for every p,  and  and @D(p;;)@p > 0.
Case 1: t < 2 1+it
 
1
   1

:When p = 12 we found that 
0   1
2

< 0 . Since  (1) > 0 for every , , t
and it, we can conclude that 
 
p; ; ; t; 
i
t

cuts the x-axis at least once. Suppose that 
 
p; ; ; t; it

= 0
and that it < D (p
; ; ). This means that if we increase p from p to p0 2 (p; 1], the level of t needed to
keep  at zero increases. As 
 
p; ; ; t; 
i
t

is increasing in t, this means that, for given t and 
i
t, if  is
cutting the x-axis at p it must be doing it from above. However, as  (1) > 0, it must be the case that it is
cutting it again from below. This last fact is not possible, as @D(p;;)@p > 0, which implies that for any other
p0 2 (p; 1], we continue to have it < D (p0; ; ): any crossing of the x-axis as p increases must occur from
above. We conclude that we must have it > D (p
; ; ), and any crossing of the x-axis for p 2   12 ; 1 must be
occurring once and from below.
Case 2: t  2 1+it
 
1
   1

: As 0
 
1
2
  0 and  (1) > 0, and given that we have just established that

 
p; ; ; t; 
i
t

can never cross the x-axis from above, it follows that 
 
p; ; ; t; 
i
t

> 0 for every p 2   12 ; 1.
The analysis of the previous two cases shows that path-dependent buying occurs either for high values or
for any value of the signal precision. If the conditions on the type-signal path are satised and this type-signal
path leads to bmt > s
m
t (b
m
t < s
m
t ) we incur in herd (contrarian) buying.
To study the e¤ect of  on p, notice that  > 0 if and only if   = (t   1)L + itL   (mt + 1)L > 0.
As L is decreasing in ,   increases in  whenever bmt < s
m
t , and it decreases in  when b
m
t > s
m
t , for every
p 2   12 ; 1. It follows that @p@ > 0 when bmt < smt , and that @p@ < 0 when bmt > smt . Moreover, when condition
(11) is satised,   is increasing in  for every p 2   12 ; 1. It follows that @p@ < 0:
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A.5 Proof of Theorem 2
Consider p = 12 . Then both the market maker and the tradersvaluations will be equal to
1
2 for every Ft , every
 and every ;  2  12 ; 1. Since we have dened herd buying only in the case where buying is strictly preferred
to any other actions, then herding is not possible.
Consider p = 1. Then for any Ft and every ;  2

1
2 ; 1

, E

V j Ft; Tt; i

= 1 if i = H (and Ft,
E

V j Ft; Tt; i

= L if i = L) and no herding is possible.
For p 2   12 ; 1, we have from (18) that herd buying occurs at t whenever
ht 1   lt 1 > L+ L

L  L +
 
bit 1   sit 1
 L   L
L  L
whose left hand side is maximized for lt 1 = 0 and whose right hand side it minimized for bit 1 = 0. The
path just described, where all buys are type I and the sells are type II, is a unique type-signal path compatible
with Ft, and the one with the highest possible tradersvaluation of the asset associated to it. It follows that
herd buying has positive probability of happening at t whenever
bmt 1 >
L+ L
L  L   s
m
t 1
L   L
L  L (20)
We cannot appeal to noise trading in order to say that a trading history such that the previous inequality is
satised has positive probability and this is enough to prove existence of herding because if, in fact, the trading
history were generated by at least one noise buy, then herding could not occur anymore. However, if the market
maker assigns positive probability to herd buying given the trading history, then consistency implies that, from
an ex-ante perspective, this probability must be positive.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
The statement is certainly satised when the possibility of herding arises for the rst time, since all informed
traders agree on E
h
V j Gjt
i
for some Gjt . Suppose that herding, in fact, occurs at t: then traders will not update
and V it = E
h
V j Gjt+1
i
= E
h
V j Gjt
i
for every i. Hence, if there is still a possibility for herding at t+ 1, traders
will all agree on the value V it .
Suppose, instead that we were not on Gjt , that there was no herding at t and that we are in fact on Gkt .
It is obvious that Ei

V j Gkt

< Ei
h
V j Gjt
i
. If that were not the case and Ei

V j Gkt
  Ei hV j Gjt i herding
would have occurred on Gkt to start with. If a type I buy occurs at t leading to the possibility of herding at t+ 1
on the k-path, we have Ei

V j Gkt ; i = H

= Ei
h
V j Gjt
i
= Ei
h
V j Gjt+1
i
, so herding at t+ 1 happens for the
same tradersprior on the Gkt and on the Gjt paths.
Suppose that herding is again possible at t+ 2 on both Gkt+2 and Gjt+2 and suppose we are in fact on Glt+2.
It follows that Ei

V j Glt

< Ei

V j Gkt

< Ei
h
V j Gjt
i
must hold. If then herding is possible on Glt+2, it must
be the case that Ei

V j Glt+2

= Ei

V j Gkt+2

= Ei

V j Gkt+1

= Ei
h
V j Gjt
i
. And so on. Q.E.D.
A.7 Proof of Theorem 3
Herd buying occurs when E

V j Ft; Tt; i = L

> At. This is equivalent to
(1  p)V it 1
(1  p)V it 1 + p
 
1  V it 1

>
h

2 + (1  ) p
i
V mt 1 + t (1  ) (1  p)V it 1

2 + (1  )

pV mt 1 + (1  p)
 
1  V mt 1

+ t (1  )

(1  p)V it 1 + p
 
1  V it 1
 :
We can re-write the above inequality as:
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t (p) = p
2
 
V it 1   V mt 1

(1  ) +  V it 1   V it 1V mt 11  2

+p

2
 
V it 1   V mt 1
  2p  V it 1   V mt 1V it 11  2

> 0.
It is easy to check thatt (1) < 0 andt
 
1
2

> 0, and that0t (p) < 0 for every p 2

1
2 ; 1

. We can conclude that
there exists a cut-o¤ p
 
V it 1; V
m
t 1; ; 

such that herd buying occurs whenever p < p
 
V it 1; V
m
t 1; ; 

:Q.E.D.
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